ABSTRACT

The conclusion summarises the considerations at the theoretical and empirical levels. A final version of the party switching metadefinition, including some cases of rebranding and replacement, is fleshed out. An umbrella term is proposed to cover all cases of party switching, rebranding, and replacement, namely parliamentary volatility. It is posited that the impact of party switching on the party system at the parliamentary level is better explained by institutional variables than by individual variables. Five measures of parliamentary volatility are extracted. The main empirical findings are presented: the most susceptible factions to party switching are pivot factions that change their position towards the government during the legislature (as opposed to permanently opposition or government factions), populist factions (as opposed to institutionalised mainstream factions), and far-left or far-right factions (as opposed to moderate left, moderate right, and centrist factions). No relationship was found between parliamentary volatility and the electoral system and electoral volatility.