ABSTRACT
This article discusses Klaus Steigleder's rights-based risk ethics through the lens of a risk-averse basic needs sufficientarianism. Both approaches belong to the same family of views: Both are rights-based positions, both substantively justify the attribution of rights as important for people being able to live an autonomous life, and both refer to the equal rights of all people. However, basic needs sufficientarianism is a version of rights consequentialism that endorses a weighted aggregation of the rights of all, while Steigleder aims at developing a Kantian approach, which proposes limits to the aggregation of rights and privileges agents’ rights. Second, Steigleder's account does not include a threshold conception, while sufficientarianism systematically specifies which rights must be fulfilled in order to lead a minimally autonomous life. Third, it is not clear how Steigleder wants to account for probabilities, while risk-averse sufficientarianism relies on weighted expected outcomes also in the context of climate change policies. Fourth, to overcome the charge of being overdemanding, Steigleder prioritizes current equal agent rights, while weak sufficientarianism endorses a weighted impartial assessment of the rights of all affected so that not even the protection of sub-threshold rights constitutes absolute restrictions to what is owed to future people. This, however, does not speak against risk-averse basic needs sufficientarianism.
