ABSTRACT
Macro-political and social processes like democratization, elite turnover, economic development, and enforcement of the rule of law can vary enormously within countries to the extent that this variation may be as sharp as the variation across countries. In this context, who governs subnational entities and how lawfully they govern can mark important differences. This chapter is about how formal institutions and informal practices come together to enable or inhibit the creation and perpetuation of subnational political elites. It argues that there are two different strategies through which subnational political elites seek to remain in control of provincial politics. One is the creation of subnational political dynasties, where power passes democratically from one relative to another, thus remaining in the family. The other involves governors’ attempts to seek reelection beyond the term limits imposed by the provincial constitution through dubious interpretations of provincial constitutional rules. When attempting this strategy, incumbents are usually assisted by local high court rulings. However, these rulings have generally been overturned by the Supreme Court. The chapter therefore explores the links between political elites and the judicialization of politics.
