ABSTRACT
The Ukraine war has put Europe's struggles to increase defence industrial production under the spotlight. Over three years since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion, questions abound on whether the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) is capable of meaningful change. The post-Cold War defence budget cuts observed throughout NATO, combined with an overreliance on ‘just-in-time’ procurement practices, continue to have significant long-term effects on Europe's potential for defence industrial output and its countries' military capabilities. Meanwhile, at a time when the continent has proved to be unable to fully satisfy domestic demand for equipment and ammunition, while sustaining the Ukrainian war effort, defence cooperation is often cited as a panacea. To be sure, at its best defence industrial cooperation can help decrease costs, increase economies of scale, and foster interoperability. Yet the defence market is unique in many ways, and its peculiar dynamics make cooperation a difficult endeavour and its outcomes far from predictable. Some European leaders have even called for a “war economy” approach to defence procurement as an alternative to long-term practices that have plagued warfighting readiness at an industrial and operational level since the end of the Cold War. Yet war economy is a loosely defined term which, even in the most cautious definition, hardly constitutes a solution to the issues of market fragmentation and competition among industrial powers, which have hitherto stood in the way of a paradigm shift. This chapter aims therefore to show that the defence market's singular nature means that changes in rates of production remain highly challenging for countries not directly involved in large-scale conflicts such as the one facing Ukraine. To that end, an accurate analysis of this issue requires a study of the contextual obstacles to more and better cooperation among Europe's defence industries.
