ABSTRACT
In Chapter 3, the notion of natural simultaneity is addressed. In the first section, it is shown that, in his analysis of the natural simultaneity of relatives, Aristotle is using the second sense of simultaneity defined in Cat. 13, 14b27–33, according to which things that satisfy both of two conditions are simultaneous by nature: they must reciprocate as to implication of existence; and neither of them can be the cause of the other’s existence. In section two, the second, causal condition, is analysed. In section three, the first condition, which is the one critical to Aristotle’s discussion of the natural simultaneity of relatives in Cat. 7, is considered. First, it is shown that, for Aristotle’s argument to make sense, reciprocation as to implication of existence must be, for him, a property not only different from correlativity (described in 6a36–37) and reciprocity (described in 6b28–36), but also narrower than them, insofar as, according to him, all relatives satisfy the latter two, but some do not satisfy the former. A specific interpretation of reciprocation as to implication of existence is then proposed, one that arguably serves Aristotle’s claim that all relatives satisfy correlativity and reciprocity, but only some satisfy reciprocation as to implication of existence.
