ABSTRACT
German leaders have responded to the pressures of the Third Nuclear Age with a mixture of continuity and change, which is reflective of a complicated political outlook. On the one hand, officials in Berlin are committed to a role for nuclear weapons as part of NATO membership and Germany plays a key part in the nuclear sharing mission through its dual-capable aircraft. Membership in NATO also means the involvement of the Bundeswehr in the Alliances’ plans to incorporate strategic non-nuclear weaponry into the Euro-Atlantic defence posture – notably medium-range missiles able to hit Russia. On the other hand, Germany has traditionally seen itself as a bridge between the West and Russia, has recently phased out the use of nuclear power for energy generation, and observed the first meeting of the TPNW. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 does appear to have shifted the debate back in favour of extended nuclear deterrence and the necessity of being part of a strong military alliance. While the commitment arms control, confidence building and risk reduction measures remain, these seem largely rhetorical at the time of writing. In this way, the mainstream German political elite exhibit classic hedger and balancer characteristics: uncertain of how best to assure security in a new nuclear era and unwilling to do anything that might upset the existing nuclear order further.
