ABSTRACT
China’s rise had been remarkably untinged with major nuclear weapons developments until the late 2010s. With a seemingly sudden build-up of delivery vehicles capable of nuclear missions, China watchers have pointed to a major shift in Chinese elites’ thinking about nuclear politics. However, a more careful analysis points to China continuing its hedging strategy. The Chinese military has also procured new supporting technologies, such as sensors, missile defences and counterspace capabilities, that widen the possibilities for decision makers in hypothetical future crises and wars. Great power competition and political wrangling are at the heart of the PRC’s need to hedge. As India grows more powerful, regional primacy cannot be taken for granted. The relationship with the United States continues to deteriorate, and Russia’s precipitous position presents its own questions. The leaders of the Communist Party have only pursued a hedging strategy in regard to technology; however, the support for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ multilateral initiatives is in reality fairly limited. With so many possible policy and technology paths forward, China’s security elite have so far made their response “wait and see” when it comes to the Third Nuclear Age.
