ABSTRACT
Japan’s position in the global nuclear order is a Janus-faced one: vehemently anti-nuclear due to its history, yet it maintains a significant nuclear hedge and enjoys an extended nuclear deterrence guarantee from the United States. Tokyo remains focused on preserving the status quo in the global order more broadly in its preference for US primacy over a balance of power created by the rise of China and others. However, Japanese leaders are particularly concerned that China is advancing beyond Japan and its allies technologically. This is why Japan has recently shifted its security posture to give greater emphasis to strategic non-nuclear capabilities and the possibility of fighting a conventional war in Northeast Asia – albeit progress towards this aim will undoubtedly be subject to budgetary constraints. The speed and material reality of Tokyo’s transformation are therefore unlikely to be the same as those of Taiwan, South Korea, Israel or even Australia, which means a concurrent need to reemphasise its alliance (and extended nuclear deterrence relationship) with the United States and embed itself in alliances and partnerships even further throughout the region. While it reserves the right to hedge against the future possibility of having to stand alone in the nuclear order by maintaining a degree of nuclear latency, for now Japan faces the Third Nuclear Age firmly anchored to others.
