ABSTRACT
Despite an extensive, multi-decade conventional military modernisation programme and interest in strategic non-nuclear capabilities, Russia’s approach to the Third Nuclear Age remains inherently nuclear. There are three parts to this: (i) nuclear weapons (both tactical and strategic) remain fundamental to deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic, and especially to the balance and relationship with the United States and NATO; (ii) having a large nuclear stockpile is seen by Russian elites as being an important component of Russia’s claim to great power status; and (iii) state-owned Rosatom is playing an increasingly influential role as a supplier of civilian nuclear reactors, cementing links with many countries in the developed and developing world. For these reasons, the pathway to security and influence in the Third Nuclear Age for leaders in Moscow remains nuclear. Somewhat paradoxically, a strong nuclear force is seen as both useful for stability through the status quo and, at the same time, a key way to compete and perhaps challenge the West and intervene in “local” conflicts.
