ABSTRACT
In this chapter we tackle the issue of epistemic decolonisation by trying to understand what this complicated conceptual framework might mean. In the first instance we need to ask ourselves the question as to why we should decolonise knowledge. One way of answering this question is to suggest that colonialism can be characterised as a single epistemic authority over and above other plausible contenders, and to then argue that this is a form of epistemic injustice. This positions the imperative to decolonise as an epistemic and ethical virtue. We also examine the relationship between primitive beliefs and practices and Western colonial science, and conclude that some of these primitive beliefs and practices cannot be thought of as ethical, sensible, superior to many colonising beliefs and practices, or as progressive. What this means is that in any decolonial process we should be prepared to discard those beliefs and practices because there are no good reasons for retaining them and because there are better and more ethical beliefs and practices available, even if the source of these is colonial.
