ABSTRACT
Two classical views of authorisation have dominated historical conversations over the relationship between the state and its citizens. The first, as advanced by Thomas Hobbes, argues that authorisation arises through the state’s provision of basic, public goods that are unavailable in the state of nature. The second, as championed by Immanuel Kant, traces authorisation to the state’s ability to represent the omnilateral will of its population – through enshrining the legal and political freedoms, civil equality, and civil independence of individual citizens. Contemporary accounts informed by these two views, such as John Parrish’s and Anna Stilz’s accounts of authorisation-centric responsibilities, offer valuable insights into reparative justice in authoritarian states. Whilst variants of both accounts encounter key challenges in their theoretical underpinnings and application to a wide range of empirical contexts, and despite clear reticence on the part of these theorists to grapple with authoritarian states, authorisation remains an incredibly attractive yet underexplored basis for the assignment of reparative responsibilities. There exist compelling reasons to think that citizens who authorise their states to act on behalf of their interests should bear at least some liabilities to address the effects of the injustices carried out by their states under their authorisation.
