ABSTRACT
Given that Joseph Smith explicitly rejects a classical conception of God, it would be surprising (if not alarming) to Smith (and ordinary Latter-day Saints) if there was strong reason to accept the existence of a being very much like the classical God: a metaphysically simple, a se, omni-God. Since such a being would be apt to cause theological fright, Miller dubs such a being a specter of classical theism. In this chapter, he argues that there is an apparently sound philosophical argument that establishes the existence of a specter of classical theism using very weak, widely accepted, and independently plausible logical principles as well as uncontroversial Latter-day Saint theological premises. This argument thus constitutes a paradox: it is an argument with apparently true premises and apparently impeccable reasoning, leading to a clearly unacceptable conclusion. Miller surveys some possible responses to the paradox and points out that these various responses are likely to make classical philosophical theology of much greater relevance to the Latter-day Saint tradition than has previously been supposed. Despite significant differences in their operative conceptions of God, Latter-day Saints have a lot to gain from serious dialogue with classical philosophy.
