ABSTRACT
This chapter describes how the US withdrawal agreement with the Taliban (the Doha Agreement) and regional peace initiatives paved the way for the advances and military victory of the Taliban. The US negotiations with the Taliban took place independently of the Afghan government, which effectively expanded the Taliban's room for manoeuvre. The chapter also outlines the failed attempts at national reconciliation in Afghanistan and how the political trajectory in Afghanistan over the 20 years shifted from one extreme to another: First by excluding the Taliban from any dialogue regarding a transitional government and participation in the parliamentary system, to having the Taliban as the primary – and sole – dialogue partner. Finally, the chapter describes how the neighbouring countries also adjusted their respective approaches to the Taliban, partly as a counterbalance to the exclusionary US line and partly as an expression of their own national security interests, including the threat posed by the Islamic State movement. Overall, this meant that from 2011 onwards, the Taliban were increasingly viewed as a legitimate dialogue partner and, in some cases, a collaborator in the fight against globally oriented jihadism.
