A Philosophical Approach to Subjectivity in Film Form

“Let us say that grief is to be represented on the screen”: with this sentence, strange as it may seem, Eisenstein introduced one of his most profound texts on the issue of representing feelings from the standpoint of film form. ² The topic of subjectivity requires such a generalizing: let us say that subjectivity is to be represented on the screen and, following Eisenstein, let us try to consider a theory of subjectivity in relation to film form. By form, we simply mean, as Eisenstein would have it, “determined much more profoundly than by a superficial ‘trick.’” ³ So is subjectivity involved in some profound determination? I am inclined to say yes. Instead of raising a theoretical barrier between film and subjectivity, I proclaim that they are strongly connected from various viewpoints. More precisely, it would be required for our present theory, in order to achieve its aim, that it encompasses both the concept of subjectivity and the concept of film form. Furthermore, I am convinced there is no better way to fulfill this task of fashioning together a theory of subjectivity and a theory of film form than within a philosophical framework. Nevertheless, I am quite aware that the topic of subjectivity is rather extensive and equivocal. Obviously, the relevance of this comprehensive subjectivity theory has yet to be confirmed, but its development embraces a wide range of issues. I will therefore introduce only those elements that concern the question of how film form and subjectivity can theoretically complement and benefit each other within a philosophical framework.