ABSTRACT
The creation of institutions presenting national discourse precedes the adoption of the Constitutional laws of 1867, but the liberalization those laws introduced and the following democratization of the empire enabled a growing number of people to gain access to what became increasingly considered as national “high culture.” The expansion of public instruction and freedom of association were the major factors of this evolution. Before 1867 the main cultural institutions were concentrated in the capitals, and the first symbols of “national” awakening (theaters, libraries, museums) had already been created there during the Vormärz. In the smaller cities some private initiatives were possible alongside church and state institutions, but they remained a limited field of action. Decentralization after 1867 made it possible for cities and provinces to initiate and finance their own cultural institutions, as we have already seen in the case of schools. This was encouraged by the state as it was believed to strengthen patriotism for the land. The creation of museums and libraries focusing on local cultural heritage had been favored by the state at the beginning of the nineteenth century as a means to foster loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty; this was combined with initiatives from provincial authorities. For this purpose, multiculturalism was clearly emphasized in these institutions. The discovery of ethnography, which occurred at the same time helped to promote the languages and folklore of the empire’s peoples, who began to see themselves as entitled to the same right to develop their respective cultures. But the leading German elite looked at them condescendingly as soon as they began trying to produce their own literature, and their growing demands for national institutions were met with reluctance by the state, who sensed a danger for the unity of the empire. This movement started with Italians, Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs, before spreading to other groups in the course of the nineteenth century. The beginning of the Constitutional era enabled practically all of them to promote their own cultural agenda. Thus, as John Boyer states: “The nationality conflict in Austria was not merely the destructive, centrifugal process that usually appears in the historiography. It was also an emancipatory, centripetal process that reshaped the 1867 state in ways that allowed all bourgeois ethnic groups to be agents, as well as subjects, of their political destiny.” 1 Most people demanded the possibility to participate in public life, but this demand was not directed against the state, which actually provided the means for a greater expression of various forms of identity. The state authorities were caught between two fires: a liberal attitude on the one hand which fostered cultural diversity seen as the main characteristic of the empire and as the expression of its strength; and caution and defiance on the other hand regarding the conflict emerging from the confrontation between national groups. As a result, the state put significant effort into preserving utraquist institutions, causing the leading national groups in Cisleithania (Germans, Poles, and Italians) to feel that the state authorities were favoring the minorities (Czechs, Slovenes and Ruthenians) when in fact they were only trying to prevent the hegemony of the dominant group over the others. Those dominant groups’ response was to develop so-called “Defense” associations (Schutzvereine), 2 which led to the growing separation of groups “constructing” their identities. The situation in Transleithania was not comparable as the Hungarians had all the levers in their hands to give Hungarian culture a decisive lead over the others.
