ABSTRACT
There are two major issues that need discussing in relation to the argument, outlined in the previous chapter, for epistemic openness – the widening of our epistemic boundaries – as a complement to scientific openness. The two issues come from different theoretical directions. First, there is the contention that knowledge is a vehicle for epistemic/cognitive oppression. Second, there is the problem of the incommensurability of knowledges. We have already had glimpses of both, but they both need more focused discussion in relation to the case for epistemic openness and its relationship with OA. We need to cover theory as well as tease out practical implications. I will discuss the first issue in this chapter. The second, I will introduce in the latter part of this chapter and then go on to discuss it further in the chapter that follows. I am going to make the case that what I will call ‘softer’ versions of the argument for knowledge as a vehicle for epistemic oppression involve a ‘moderate constructionism’, and I will relate these to the idea of bias. Addressing biases of various sorts is a significant priority for science in general, including the domain of scholarly communication. However, I will argue, ‘harder’ versions of the epistemic oppression narrative rely on ‘thoroughgoing constructionism’ and, I will contend, create problems. There are particular problems of relativism and incommensurability, that help to indicate where the limits of the argument for epistemic openness should lie.
