ABSTRACT
In this chapter, I want to outline a meta-theoretical position that accommodates a range of knowledge forms, allowing epistemic openness, but at the same time, does not involve relinquishing the idea that different propositions may have greater demonstrable validity than others. I will argue that this position, summarised under the label ‘critical realism’, has significant explanatory power as a meta-theoretical undergirding for research. It helps us to navigate between the extremes of (adapted-) positivism and thoroughgoing constructionism, and it can also assist in recognising the value of openness. I will argue that critical realism helps us to understand how epistemic openness can work – its character and its limits. I will also argue that critical realism provides a useful basis for making the case for open access. I will go on to discuss social theory compatible with critical realism and its relationship with the case for openness, which I will argue is a strong one. I will illustrate my discussion with engagement with meta-theory and social theory developed by critical realists such as Roy Bhaskar, Margaret Archer, Christian Smith, and Dave Elder-Vass. I will also discuss social theory compatible with critical realism, such as commons theory, which has been explicitly used to frame open access by its founder Elinor Ostrom and others. I will suggest that an approach based on critical realism can help us navigate many of the debates around OA where advocates of OA and its critics are often talking past each other without finding the language or concepts to engage with each other's arguments.
