ABSTRACT
This chapter contains an exposition and a critical assessment of Hans Kelsen’s conception of modern democracy, which takes into account Kelsen’s theory of law and legal science—undoubtedly his chief intellectual project—but does not reduce the former to the latter. In doing so, it will also establish relevant comparisons and contrasts to the intellectual and political orientations of Max Weber and Carl Schmitt, which were the subject matter of previous chapters. The text is structured in three main parts. In the first section, it offers a sketch of Kelsen’s pure theory of law, probing into its philosophical underpinnings and crucial conceptual and methodological distinctions. In the second moment, the focus shifts to Kelsen’s theory and defence of parliamentary democracy, where one underscores its pluralistic consequences. Third, the chapter presents a reflection on the tensions that dwell in Kelsen’s scientistic worldview, examining the claim that relativism constitutes the link connecting his legal science to his democratic thought. We conclude by suggesting the Lefortian notion of indeterminacy as a fruitful substitute for relativism to think about democratic pluralism beyond Kelsen.
