ABSTRACT
What is the scope of justice? What is the relationship between justice and other moral ideals? What should we do if these ideals come into conflict? This chapter addresses metatheoretical questions like these. Economic efficiency is defined, and its theoretical relevance discussed. One of meritocracy’s alluring features is that it resolves the to-this-point-vexing equity/efficiency trade-off. Any theory of justice should be reasonably efficient; if it is not, we are unjustified in believing that the theory is true. In addition, theories should suggest public policies that are attractive, and that are palatable when their moral opportunity costs are kept in mind. Meritocracy satisfies these metatheoretical requirements. The chapter then summarizes the debate over ideal and non-ideal theory, arguing that meritocracy, and desert-based justice generally, can surmount non-ideal hurdles. Finally, meritocracy’s perfectionism is discussed. No government can be truly neutral; every decision made, or not made, shapes citizens’ preferences. While there are objective goods and bads, a meritocratic government does not impose these on its citizens. Rather, it provides a framework in which the goods, whatever they be, can most effectively be pursued.
