ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses claims and counterclaims that surround proposed reforms of legal language. It shows that why making changes to legal language is difficult by presenting a practical task based on an early English statute. Engaging with issues surrounding reform of legal language, either theoretically or practically, calls for more precise formulation of what the problems are. Despite presumed good intentions behind these professional principles, criticisms of legal English have been expressed almost throughout the historical period in which legal English has been recognised as a variety. The practical question arises, for instance, whether reforms should be applied only to new legislation and related documents, or whether one implication of opting for such reforms is a need to review all earlier legal sources. D. Crystal likens critiques of established legal usage to criticism of the language of science for its impenetrability and the language of religion for its mystique. The chapter concludes with observations about current 'plain language reform' proposals.
