ABSTRACT
This chapter shows how emphasis in law on singular, correct interpretation differs from the descriptive and explanatory approach adopted in linguistics. It considers the reasoning processes used in 'construction' to arrive at the meaning of problematic words and phrases in texts whose legal effect depends on their legislative purpose, not only on the meaning of individual words or grammatical relations between them. The specialised approach to interpretation in law can make the process baffling to someone who insists that natural language processing is always an instantaneous and spontaneous process. Use of words and phrases such as 'open texture' and 'penumbra' to characterise word meanings and categories is figurative. C. Hutton examines use of such figurative language in judicial reasoning, especially in frequent appeals to binary oppositions in determining a word's scope. Although legal language is drafted as precisely as possible, courts often find themselves having to decide the legal meaning of disputed words before they can apply the law.
