ABSTRACT
On 6 Ocober 1973, large numbers of Egyptian and Syrian military units crossed the frontiers with Israel that had held since 1970. Around 240 Egyptian warplanes crossed radar installations. At the same time, some 1800 artillery and mortar positions opened up along the whole front and 700 Syrian tanks attacked the Golan Heights where the Israeli land forces had only been able to deploy some 150 tanks. Although reports had already been circulating throughout the summer of an Egyptian-Syrian attack, the Israeli army command appeared to be caught by surprise. It seems that they were only convinced that the threat was serious a few days before the actual outbreak of the war. The possibility of a pre-emptive strike was briefly considered, but there was insufficient time for the necessary preparations. And furthermore, Israel would then be branded in international opinion as the aggressor. The decision therefore, as the Dutch Ambassador G.J. Jongejans reported to The Hague, was to wait whilst at the same time ‘seeking the full moral and political advantage’ of that re- straint. 1
