ABSTRACT
On 29 July 1905, just before the start of the Russo-Japanese peace negotiations, American Secretary of War William H. Taft and Japanese Prime Minister Katsura Taro signed a secret memorandum in Japan in which Washington recognised Japanese control over Korea and Tokyo that of the United States over the Philippines (an easier target of a Japanese attack than Hawaii). In doing so, Washington conveniently forgot that the Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation that it had concluded with Korea in 1882 held the mutual obligation to mediate and ‘bring about an amicable arrangement’ should ‘other Powers deal unjustly or oppressively’ with the other treaty partner. 1 London also gave Tokyo a free hand. Sacrificing Korea had been on the mind of British politicians at least since 1901, when Ashmead-Bartlett had suggested in the House of Commons that to prevent an alliance between Russia and Japan, Great Britain could ‘offer Japan a protectorate over Korea’. 2 In the adjusted Anglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded in August 1905, this became a reality. There was no longer any mention, as there had been in 1902, of respecting Korea’s independence. Article III spoke of Japan ‘possessing paramount political, military and economic interests in Corea’ and of Great Britain recognising the right of Japan ‘to take such measures of guidance, control and protection of Corea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests’. Tokyo did not wait long to act. On 17 November 1905, in yet another Japanese-Korean Agreement, also known as the Eulsa Treaty or Japanese-Korean Protectorate Treaty, the Korean government had to confirm Japanese indirect rule. The following month Japan instituted the position of a Resident-General in Korea and appointed Ito Hirobumi. In retrospect, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs would argue that Japan’s decision to establish a protectorate over Korea had been inspired by ‘grave concern’ over the situation in Korea, ‘which proved to be fruitful sources of difficulty in the Extreme East, involving Japan in serious complications’ (Lawton 1912: 1093). The protectorate only added to the anti-Japanese feelings. Resistance was brutally suppressed (McKenzie n.d.: 185-90). In London Grey, anxious not to jeopardise Great Britain’s special relationship with Japan, turned a blind eye to what was happening in Korea (Cockburn 2012). The Houses of Parliament also remained silent.
