ABSTRACT
Establishing identity, the identity of the philosophical through the work of differentiation, takes place, for example, in Hegel’s argument that while philosophy may involve thought it needs to be distinguished from what he describes as ‘thought in general’. The force of this distinction lies first in the possibility, once it is formulated, of presenting philosophy as escaping any reduction to common sense. In general terms-i.e. in terms not simply Hegelian —this would amount to trying to overcome the reduction of a prevailing identity to a constituent part. It must be noted that here this presentation has to take place, and can only take place, in terms of this formulation. The importance of avoiding this type of reduction is found in the resulting argument of Hegel’s that what is described as ‘common sense’ is out of step with consciousness itself. Again in broader terms this means that the constituent part is not in accord with the prevailing identity or universal. Second, it gives philosophy specificity while maintaining its connection to consciousness. It is therefore simultaneously associated and disassociated. Third, the consequence of this mutual association and disassociation is that it allows philosophy to contain the truth of consciousness-a truth that is inevitably betrayed by common sense, even though common sense is presented as itself already comprising an aspect of consciousness. The identity of philosophy arises out of this differentiation. Establishing identity as a result of the process of differentiation is only possible because of the nature of the initial association. (The necessary presence of this reciprocity of dependence must be noted.) This movement, rehearsing the problem of identity as linked to the relationship between association and disassociation, will be examined in greater detail at a later stage. What is here identified as association and disassociation, it will be argued, forms an integral part of what can be called after Hegel, though not following him, the logic of diremption. The interplay of association and disassociation will be redefined in terms of the problem of the chance or contingent occurrence, a problem that is itself articulated within-thus articulating-the logic of diremption. (It is therefore unthinkable outside of it. The mere positing of diremption is no more than a naive gesture, gesturing towards the philosophical.) Logic in this context means the structured presentation and strategic use of diremption; diremption as discursive. The use here is its work. With diremption there remains the difficulty
of what it names and thus to what extent it can be understood as naming diremptively. The turning backwards and forwards of terms on themselves attests, it will be argued, to the anoriginal presence of a differential ontology. (In the end it may be that diremption names the event.) It will be further suggested that this is an ontological claim and not simply one that is concerned with semantics and thus polysemy.
