ABSTRACT
A salient characteristic of the so-called low-cost carriers (LCCs) is that they tend to focus their activities on secondary airports, Ryanair being the exemplar of this practice. The low cost business model has been hugely successful and, in so far as the LCCs have taken business from full-service carriers, they will have helped to reduce pressures on capacity at major airports. But pressures remain and at some airports, of which Heathrow is a prime example, there is an acute shortage of capacity. This state of affairs might appear to run counter to the arguments set out in Part III of the book, namely that airports, subject to economic regulation, will be inclined to over-invest. But the contradiction is more apparent than real. It does not follow that investment is always done efficiently or is focused on where it is most needed. More importantly, there are serious planning and environmental constraints that limit both the scale and the speed at which capacity can be added, notwithstanding the ambitions of the airport owners and managers.
