ABSTRACT
As we have seen, in February 2006 Hizbullah and Aoun’s FPM established an accord that brought them together in opposition to the 14 March camp. Thereafter, the Memorandum of Understanding gradually deepened and became a solid alliance. The beleaguered Seniora government, backed by the US and France, now faced strong pressure from the Hizbullah-led opposition, which called for step-by-step political escalation – first, the demonstrations in December 2006 (see Chapter 5), followed by a general strike in January 2007 and a campaign of civil disobedience in March – in the hope that the government would be compelled to surrender. Sunni presence in the opposition movement generally and at the rallies was weak. On 8 December 2006, a joint Shi’a-Sunni prayer meeting was organized in downtown Beirut, whilst opposition leaders considered storming the official headquarters of the Prime Minister, inspired by recent events in Ukraine.1 However, the street politics proved counter-productive in that the Seniora government survived and sectarian polarization and violence continued. The 23 January 2007 general strike, coupled with a plan aimed at blocking important transit roads, escalated into armed confrontations in Beirut, Tripoli and elsewhere, whilst riots erupted between Shi’a and Sunnis in and around the Arab University.2 Hizbullah’s militants also stormed those sectors of Beirut that were affiliated with the rival FM. The violent confrontations between Shi’a and Sunnis created deep wounds among the latter, many of whom, most notably Saad al-Hariri, felt humiliated and offended. Given the sectarian nature of the violence, cohabitation and tolerance between the two Muslim communities became increasingly unlikely. Apparently, street politics and political escalation led inexorably to sectarian violence. Hizbullah, which had planned the escalation, was unable to control the violence. Thus, ‘the more sectarian the struggle, the more resonant were 14 March accusations that Hizbullah, far from representing a national resistance, had become a cover for a Shi’a militia’. Fearing a backlash, the opposition called off the general strike, but the sit-in continued in downtown Beirut and eventually evolved into a political stalemate that left the country without an elected president. In a bid to defuse the sectarian tension Nasrallah ‘felt compelled to issue a fatwa’ (a religious edict) that called on all Shi’a, and particularly Hizbullah members, to refrain from resorting to violence.3
