ABSTRACT
The dizzily rapid decline in fertility, among many other indications of what may be called defamiliation – social tendencies and behavior to avoid, postpone, reduce, escape, and/or break familial relationships (see Section 4 of this chapter for its various symptoms) – is particularly puzzling if one considers the tenacious attachment of South Koreans to their families in social, economic and even political life. Despite the explosively rapid economic, social, and political change in recent several decades, family-centeredness is known as an enduring trait of South Korean culture. During the tumultuous processes of colonization, war, military rule and industrialization, they could not turn to the state or local communities for material, physical, or psychological protection. Instead, they have coped with various crises, explored new opportunities, and maintained social identities only through familial support and protection. As shown throughout the preceding chapters of this book, South Koreans’ familism (gajokjuui, meaning family-centeredness) has been a crucial mechanism for managing the rapid social, political, and economic changes since the mid-twentieth century. So why are they so reluctant to physically preserve family today? In a nutshell, the family-centeredness of South Koreans has been responsible for their internationally unparalleled fertility decline. It is true that many “usual” causes of fertility decline exist in South Korea. For instance, an extremely rapid industrialization has drawn the rural population to urban factories, offices, shops, and schools, thereby transforming them into modern proletarian or semiproletarian classes whose family situation, according to John Caldwell, makes a big family an irrational option.5 The speed of urbanization (and, concomitantly, proletarianization) is yet another area in which South Korea has surpassed all other nations (see Table 8.1). Improvement in South Koreans’ educational level and living standards has been no less drastic. In particular, educational progress among women has inevitably made pregnancy, and sometimes even marriage, a serious personal sacrifice. These usual factors alone, however, cannot explain either the plummeting fertility rate or the no less rapid and profound changes occurring in other aspects of life related to family. Divorce, separation, family
abandonment, late marriage and a single life have been increasing, all at alarming rates. These are, like the declining birth-rate, symptoms of the excessive burdens of family relations and responsibilities. The family-centered life of South Koreans does not presuppose a uniform family ideology. On the contrary, as a result of explosively rapid social and economic transformations and overwhelming Western influences, the values and norms of South Koreans regarding family life and relations have become more diverse and complex than those of most other nations. As discussed in Chapter 2, South Koreans have been simultaneously exposed to what can be categorized as Confucian familism, instrumental familism, affectionate familism and individualistic familism. Different individuals have accepted each of these family ideologies to different degrees, according to their generation, region, gender, and educational background. Consequently, each family is now confronted with the psychological tension and conflict caused by the contradictions between the different family ideologies and the functional burdens arising from diverse familial roles and responsibilities prescribed in these multiple ideologies.
