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Chapter

The Possibilities and Problems of Bifurcated Intentionality

Chapter

The Possibilities and Problems of Bifurcated Intentionality

DOI link for The Possibilities and Problems of Bifurcated Intentionality

The Possibilities and Problems of Bifurcated Intentionality book

The Possibilities and Problems of Bifurcated Intentionality

DOI link for The Possibilities and Problems of Bifurcated Intentionality

The Possibilities and Problems of Bifurcated Intentionality book

ByCarl B. Sachs
BookIntentionality and the Myths of the Given: Between Pragmatism and Phenomenology

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Edition 1st Edition
First Published 2014
Imprint Routledge
Pages 24
eBook ISBN 9781315653945

ABSTRACT

This chapter proposes the need for a new account of intentionality, what the author call bifurcated intentionality. Two philosophically salient reasons motivated this account: the need to respond to Rosenberg's eliminativism about intentionality and the need to satisfy the demand for transcendental friction. The chapter shows how the account of bifurcated intentionality can be used to resolve two debates examined earlier: the McDowell-Sellars debate and the McDowell-Dreyfus debate. A salient advantage of bifurcated intentionality is that people can accept Sellars's thought in a modified form: that discursive intentionality is not world-relational. The chapter focuses on three philosophers: Lance, Kukla, and Mark Okrent, who have advanced similar views. Whereas Kukla and Lance emphasize the normative pragmatics of discursive practices and aim for a more concrete and embodied conception of those practices than Brandom achieved, Okrent emphasizes the importance of an intentionality of purposive animal behaviour upon which the intentionality of rationality depends.

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