ABSTRACT
Pragmatic encroachment theories of knowledge may be characterized as views according to which practical factors may partly determine the truth-value of ascriptions that S knows that p—even though these factors do not partly determine S’s belief that p or p itself. The pros and cons of variations of pragmatic encroachment are widely discussed in epistemology. But despite a long pragmatist tradition in the philosophy of science, few efforts have been devoted to relate this particular view to issues in philosophy of science. 1 Consequently, a central aim of the present chapter is to consider how the contemporary debates over pragmatic encroachment connect to philosophy of science. Here is the plot:
In Section 2 , I provide a general characterization of pragmatic encroachment theories and restrict the discussion to one branch of it.
In Section 3 , I compare and contrast scientific and non-scientific knowledge and note some trademark features of scientific knowledge that will be relevant for the subsequent discussion.
In Section 4 , I move from exposition to argument by presenting some cases that challenge pragmatic encroachment on scientific knowledge.
In Section 5 , I argue that a general argument contra pragmatic encroachment theories extends to compromise pragmatic encroachment accounts of scientific knowledge.
In Section 6 , I consider whether my arguments against pragmatic encroachment may be rebutted by embedding pragmatic encroachment in the anti-realist framework of constructive empiricism.
In Section 7 , I conclude by arguing that the challenges for pragmatic encroachment on scientific knowledge are grave and that they cast doubt on pragmatic encroachment generally.
