ABSTRACT
The works of György Márkus and Hannah Arendt represent two irreconcilable tendencies of contemporary radical philosophy. Whereas Márkus’s critical theory of culture actively refrains from attributing metaphysical significance to its heuristic concepts and the mutable practices they contingently designate, Arendt’s phenomenological methodology attempts to elucidate the constitution of the modern world in order to evince the ontological significance of the political. Due to the inimical nature of their respective projects, Márkus’s writings largely consign their references to Arendt to marginalia. In this article, I consider the exception by taking as my point of departure Márkus’s only substantive comments about Arendt in ‘Beyond the Dichotomy: Poiesis and Praxis’. From a culturological perspective, I then reconstruct the ambivalent conceptions tacitly inhering in Arendt’s principal accounts of culture. In doing so, I reaffirm that Arendt denigrates poiesis but also show that she regards culture and cultural reception as derivative to the political and praxis. The purpose of this exposition is not to resolve the dispute in one or the other direction but to render perspicuous the fundamental choice evident in their opposition.
