ABSTRACT
In this essay I shall offer some comments on Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following in the Philosophical Investigations (185-242). I share the view voiced by many commentators that these remarks provide a key to the proper understanding of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the nature of language, meaning and understanding. However, I find myself in disagreement with the way this key role of Wittgenstein’s remarks tends to be construed in a considerable part of the literature. The main reason for what often seems to me to be a misconstrual of the purposes of Wittgenstein’s considerations is a tendency of many interpretations to neglect or disregard what, in my view, is at once the most striking and challenging aspect of the Philosophical Investigations, namely, the view they present of the nature of philosophical problems and their proper treatment. This tendency is by no means a peculiarity of the discussion of Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following though, as I hope to show, it is more of a curiosity with regard to them given the frequency and explicitness with which he gives prominence to their methodological purpose. By focusing, more than has been usual, on this aspect of his investigation. I hope to throw a little more light both on Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations and on his later way of thinking.
