ABSTRACT
Oratio obliqua constructions pose well-known problems for a theory which systematically assigns truth-conditions to utterances in a language. In order to solve these problems, Donald Davidson, in 'On Saying That', 1 offers a para tactic representation of the logical form of sentences containing oratio obliqua constructions. Davidson's theory is beautiful and illuminating; perhaps there are difficulties in its further elaboration, but this paper will not criticize it on this or any other score. However, Davidson develops his approach by way of offering to correct 'a subtle flaw' (p. 168) which he claims to find in a promising alternative, namely an approach which employs quotation. In this paper I question the cogency of Davidson's objection to his quotational rival. In the course of doing so, I query the account of quotation which Davidson sketches in 'On Saying That', and elaborate a promising competitor (section VI). The competitor proves subject to difficulties, however (section VII), which help to motivate a different later suggestion of Davidson's own (section VIII). If quotation is understood in this final, and I think satisfactory, way, then Davidson's argument against a quotational account of indirect discourse fails; but the quotational account still will not do (section X). I conclude (section Xl) with some remarks about what is achieved by Davidson's paratactic theory.
