ABSTRACT
"Subjective" reasons motivate conduct directly; "objective" reasons motivate conduct indirectly, by giving rise to emotions and beliefs. Many philosophers believe that the normative use of the word is fundamental, indicative and subjunctive uses being derivative. In their view, to give somebody a reason for doing something is to tell him why he ought to do it; the fact that he might not be inclined to do it, even after learning the reason, will then be utterly irrelevant. In the nineteenth century, this belief led philosophers to regard logic and ethics as normative sciences. Despite its continued appeal to Rationalist moral philosophers, this view seems to be mistaken, in at least two ways. First, it confuses the question whether something is a reason with the question whether it is a good reason. Second, the normative view is viciously circular. Despite this, that the normative can be reduced to the indicative has been repeatedly disputed.
