ABSTRACT
Some sensory experiences are pleasant, some unpleasant. The metaphysics of sensory affect is the functional role the sensory information plays in the mental economy of the agent. This chapter looks at the state of art in the philosophy of mind, presents the main contenders, and then critically compares and contrasts them. In particular, it examines how they handle the reason-giving power of affective states. The chapter also looks into two representationalist proposals and a functionalist proposal and argues that, contrary to their own advertisements, the representationalist proposals do not adequately account for why and how sensory affect can motivate, rationalize, and justify subsequent behavior and intentional mental activity. It shows that the functionalist proposal does a much better job in this regard, and that when the representationalist proposals are modified to do a better job, they may fare better not because of their representationalist credentials but due to their functionalist ones.
