ABSTRACT
Closely connected with the epistemological problem is an even more serious ontological difficulty. Saying that natural rights exist where they lack protection detaches the concept from the very thing that gives it such determinate meaning as it has for us, making it largely emotive. There are two replies to this objection, one very old, and the other comparatively new. The writings of political philosopher Alan Gewirth provide unintentional illustration of this fact. Making no reference to God, Gewirth argues that people have a right—a natural right—to whatever they need. Gewirth puts the analysis this way: Since human beings are by nature agents, they are entitled to the rights that are necessary for agency. The talk of natural rights is proleptic discourse, which confuses wishes with facts and corrupts even the understanding of conventional rights, the prototype. The chapter argues that detaching rights from the human practice of protecting them deprives them of clear meaning.
