ABSTRACT
From the beginning of the occupation, US officials recognized a close linkage between demilitarization and democratization on the one hand and economic recovery on the other. The SWNCC indicated, “A process of [democratic] reorientation will only be as effective as it goes hand in hand with some gradual improvement in the economic condition of the ordinary Japanese toward whom it is directed.”2 George E.Blakeslee, a member of the FEC’s mission to Japan, also recognized that “the immediate problem is economic. A sane democracy cannot rest on an empty stomach.” He warned that a malfunctioning economy might ruin the early accomplishment of the United States. “Economic distress normally leads to an attempt to change the existing government to one which promises relief-either an extreme right wing or an extreme left wing government.”3 Robert Fearey warned that failure in the economic recovery would make success in the first two objectives meaningless. He contended that Japan’s “current pro-American, pro-democratic and anti-Soviet, anti-communist tendencies could be completely reversed…if impelled by acute economic distress or national insecurity, possibly combined with Soviet pressure.”4 SCAP proclaimed that the occupation policy should convince the Japanese people that democracy would pay off: “Nothing will serve better to win the Japanese people over to a peaceful, democratic way of life than the discovery that it brings rewards in the way of better living and increasing economic security.”5 Colonel R.M.Cheseldine of the War Department warned, “Our failure to assist in the
recovery of her economy will cause her to lose confidence in our form of democracy.”6 In April 1947, the American Institute of Pacific Relations held a round table discussion dealing with American policy toward Japan. Participants generally held the opinion that the Japanese industrial recovery, with appropriate guidance, would accelerate the spread of democracy in Japan.7 George Atcheson, Political Adviser in Japan, believed, “The ultimate success of the Occupation will depend to a great extent upon economic factors.”8 Senator Elbert D.Thomas agreed that in the long run, “the final test of our policies will take place in the economic field. If we fail there, democracy will not stand in Japan.”9 R.W.Barnett of the State Department also regarded it imperative to adopt positive policies for economic recovery: “U.S.policy statement should be formulated in such terms as make clear the desirability for a ‘shift in emphasis’ from a passive, restrictive, or negative attitude toward a positive attitude so far as increasing trade and industrial productivity are concerned.…”10 State Department officials advised Frank Hussey, SCAP political adviser, “Sentiment was gradually building up in the United States to concentrate full attention to the economic recovery of occupied areas so that American tax payer may be relieved of the burden of supporting them.”11
