ABSTRACT
Pyrrhonists themselves describe Scepticism as an agōgē, a way of life (PH 1 1, 4, 21-2; cf. 17; Chapter II: 9); its goal is ataraxia, freedom from mental disturbance (ibid. 25-30), which is also described as the ‘causal origin of the Sceptic way’ (ibid. 12); and it appears to prescribe a method of achieving that end. We are to investigate every non-evident issue, and by means of the Sceptical ability to oppose appearance to appearance, judgement to judgement, etc., such that every non-phenomenal issue will appear to be controverted, and every non-phenomenal claim seem to have precisely as much to be said for it as against it (ibid. 8-11), and this isostheneia, or equipollence of argument (ibid. 8, 10, 26), leads us to epochē, or suspension of judgement (ibid. 26) upon which ataraxia supervenes ‘as a shadow on a body’ (ibid. 29; cf. 26; Chapter II: 12). The Sceptic does not do away with the appearances, as some allege (ibid. 19-20:7): on the contrary, he lives ‘by adhering to them according to an observance of life, undogmatically’ (ibid. 23: 9; cf. 10).
