ABSTRACT
This chapter shows that both Generals Washington and George Marshall had balanced relationships in the civil-military nexus while leading the Army and that the structure and norms employed to support those relationships helped the US achieve victory in the wars they were fighting. The styles of Generals Washington and Marshall will be contrasted later in the chapter with those of Generals Earle Wheeler and Richard Myers. Although loyal, courageous, intelligent, and tactically and technically competent, Wheeler and Myers ultimately proved ineffective representing the military profession during key moments and meetings as deliberations unfolded over policy towards Vietnam and Iraq. Examination of civil-military relationships during the American Revolution reflects a lively, sometimes contentious, but generally healthy dynamic between the Continental Congress and the Commander-in-Chief, General George Washington. Westmoreland's response highlighted the extensive civilian dominance of the civil-military nexus as associated with US actions in Vietnam. But he is wrong about the McNamara team.
