ABSTRACT
This chapter examines some of the choice-structuring attributes of offenders that make them suitable as co-offenders, some of the constraints and transaction costs that are built into this searching process, and some of the various strategies by which efficient crime networks can nonetheless develop. Routine credit card and cheque frauds often require either a market of stolen or counterfeited company cheques and credit cards or a market for defrauded goods. As a result, crime rates may depend on two separate search processes: the search for co-offenders and the search for targets. Disorganized crime areas tend to be characterized by a substantial residential instability of both offenders and nonoffenders. Potential offenders living in such areas may either choose a solo offending strategy or may seek strong ties with a closed network of co-offenders. The larger the size of an offender's crime-relevant ties, the more likely the chances of experiencing hazards of various sorts.
