This chapter deals with Sellars’s account of inference as a form of rule-following. The account is based on a distinction between two kinds of rules which Sellars calls “rules of action” and “rules of criticism”, the former pertaining to intentional actions and the latter to behavior which may be rational without consisting of intentional actions. While obeying a rule of action implies the acquisition by inference of a belief, following a rule of criticism does not. This is crucial for understanding inferential judgments. On the hypothesis that inferring is rule-guided, acquisition by inference of a belief would be impossible if all rules were rules of action. In order to avoid this consequence, Sellars conceives of inferring as guided by rules of criticism. The chapter defends his account by contrasting it with the view of Paul Boghossian who classifies inferring as intentional action and, therefore, can’t solve the “Inference Problem for Intentional Views of Rule-Following”. Not only does this problem not arise for Sellars, his account meets a criterion of adequacy supported by Boghossian, namely, that a certain act is a case of rule-following only if it is performed because of the rule requiring it.