ABSTRACT
The Spartans had ‘lost’ the Archidamian War and needed peace in 421 more than the Athenians, especially as they were desperate to get back the ‘hoplites’ captured on Sphacteria in 425 (Thuc. 5.15.1 – all references in this chapter are to Thucydides, unless otherwise stated). In the first place, they had failed in their primary declared aim of liberating the Greeks from Athenian domination (2.8.4). Second, the Spartan reputation for military excellence had plummeted after their defeat at Sphacteria, leading to a drastic diminution of their prestige and authority among their Peloponnesian allies and Greece:
Third, the cornerstone of their strategy – the annual invasions and laying waste of Attica – neither had forced the Athenians into a decisive pitched battle nor had destroyed their will to resist, even after the devastating consequences of the plague. Fourth, the Spartans had been forced to abandon this key strategy after the capture of 292 hoplites (including 120 Spartiates) on Sphacteria owing to the Athenian threats to execute them if the Spartans invaded Attica. Fifth, damaging raids from Cythera and Pylos were being directed against Spartan territory – see below. Sixth, the ‘Helots’ were deserting, and the Spartans feared that the loyal ones might be tempted to stage another Helot revolt (5.14.3). Finally, their Thirty Year’s Peace with Argos was coming to an end in 421 or 420, and the Argives were determined to exploit Spartan difficulties and replace them as leaders of the Peloponnese (5.28.2) – a distinct possibility, since the Spartans suspected (rightly as events proved) that some of her most important allies were considering switching sides (5.14.4). The Athenians were also keen to make peace:
Nicias led the pro-peace supporters at Athens and, although Thucydides ascribes personal motives to him (5.16.1), there were compelling reasons for him to pursue this policy. As a supporter of Pericles’war aims, Nicias believed that these had been achieved: the Athenians had ‘won through’ (1.144.1), had avoided defeat, and, by wearing the Spartans down, thus disabused them of the belief that Athens could easily be conquered. Nicias wanted a return to the ‘dual hegemony’, the policy that had underpinned the original Thirty Year Peace of 446/5, the terms of which had probably been initially agreed by Pericles and King Pleistoanax of Sparta. It comes as no surprise that Pleistoanax, having returned to Sparta from exile in c.426/5, was also enthusiastic for peace.
The Peace of Nicias was finally concluded in about March 421 BC after negotiations throughout the previous winter (5.17). Its main terms, as stated by Thucydides (5.18-23), were as follows:
