ABSTRACT
One of the cornerstones, probably the most important, of post-Mao China’s foreign policy is Beijing’s interest in stability, both at home and abroad. Global relaxation is perceived as essential for promoting China’s modernization, development and growth – Beijing’s top priorities since the late 1970s, and even more so since the early 1990s. Since then, and reflecting the lessons of the Iran-Iraq War, Beijing has consistently supported the settlement of outstanding international problems by peaceful means, through negotiation and diplomacy, rather than by force and violence, systematically opposing the use of terrorism. This is a far cry from Mao’s promotion of revolution, armed struggle and People’s War, a policy that Beijing now officially and evidently rejects. Regional confrontations, conflicts and tension are perceived by the Chinese as harmful to their (primarily economic) interests. In this respect the PRC could hardly be regarded as a threat.1 Yet this conclusion is much too rhetorical and simplistic. To begin with, there are always (at least) two sides to Chinese behaviour.
Words and deeds do not always converge. Moreover, these two concepts, “China” and “threat,” represent enormously complicated, diversified and multilateral entities. For one thing, Beijing’s control of its agents (provinces, corporations, banks and representatives) has improved substantially over the years, yet is nonetheless far from being total. Though less likely today, some organizations and individuals do promote their own particular interests (corporate or private) that do not always conform to the universalist interests of the state, occasionally without its knowledge let alone authorisation. For another, the Chinese leadership itself is often torn by conflicting interests, agendas and priorities that occasionally lead to contradictory policies and actions. Careful not to become directly involved in conflict zones, or identify with one or some of the protagonists, Beijing has nonetheless become, willingly or not, indirectly involved. Viewed in this perspective, the Chinese threat to the Middle East could be regarded as nontraditional, implicit, indirect, potential or “threat by proxy”, sometimes unintended.
