ABSTRACT
The critical postwar development has been the massive and ongoing buildup of the Soviet strategic arsenal. Intelligence estimates suggest that by the mid-1990s nearly all of the Soviet Union's present strategic systems will have been renewed, modernized, and thus will likely have a much smaller circular error probabilities. Particularly disturbing is the fact that the Soviet buildup has focused primarily on those weapons that could give Moscow the capability to launch a disarming first strike against US strategic forces. The combination of a limited strategic defense and a conscious limit on offensive strategic systems indicate that we discriminate, as much as possible, between military objectives and defenseless populations. In 1984, the Soviet Union produced 350 intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, while the United States turned out only 80 submarin. Particularly disturbing is the fact that the Soviet buildup has focused primarily on those weapons that could give Moscow the capability to launch a disarming first strike against US strategic forces.
