ABSTRACT

The People's Republic of China (PRC) played a rather clever Taiwan card in August 1982, succeeding in getting the United States to promise gradually to reduce arms sales to Taiwan. The Asian strategic triangle remains in being, but the role of predominance it has had in the interrelationships among the powers in Asia seems likely to give way to a more complex set of factors. Ambitious plans for "reform" of the structure of the economy are being promoted by the leadership in Peking, setting as an official goal the quadrupling of the gross value of industrial and agricultural output by the end of the century. The Soviets clearly are militarily superior to the PRC, but they nevertheless feel less than secure. The PRC has an increasing capability to retaliate with strategic and tactical nuclear weapons should the Soviets invade China, and the Soviets fear that the United States might come to the aid of the PRC in a Sino-Soviet war.