ABSTRACT
The debate on institutional or constitutional engineering (Lijphart 1977; 2008; Horowitz 1985; Sisk 1996; Reilly 2002; Bogaards 2003a; Kurtenbach and Mehler 2013) has led to a number of ideas on how to make formal state institutions work for peace and democracy. However, thus far, comparative empirical research has found only limited evidence that institutional engineering can actually help in the management of ethnic confl ict (see e.g. Selway and Templeman 2012; Wimmer 2012). This chapter argues that this may be because the success of institutional engineering in multiparty systems depends on the depth of divisions. According to the late Robert A. Dahl (1996), the relationship between institutional arrangements and democracy is nonlinear: institutions may be largely irrelevant when conditions are very favourable or extremely bad; however, ‘in-between’ institutions may make the diff erence. This chapter thus asks: Does the depth of divisions condition the impact of (inclusive) institutions on ethnic confl ict?
