ABSTRACT
Introduction Transformational change to Gramscian hegemonic structures will occur only if three conditions are met. First, the hegemonic structure itself must be clearly defined, presenting a distinct and unmistakable target for change. Second, it must be riven by persistent anomalies which indicate that its belief system has been overextended, and that change might be possible, and perhaps imminent. Third, there must be among the population of civil society ‘organic intellectuals’ around whom counter-hegemonic social forces might be organized. This chapter will assess the prospects for transformational change (that is, a paradigm shift) by examining the evolution and current status of transnational civil society, and by uncovering tensions and contradictions inherent to the growth paradigm which may presage conflict between counter-hegemonic social forces and those who remain loyal to paradigmatic commitments. The hegemonic growth paradigm which structures the domain of international relations by functioning as a dominant form of governance has not been clearly defined to date, and therefore has not presented a distinct target for dissident opinion. In this regard, I have intended throughout to bring to sharper relief the contours, the substance and the meaning of the paradigm so that its trajectory and ramifications can be more readily perceived, at least from a neo-Gramscian point of view, and so that the first condition for change will have been met. Subsequent sections of this chapter will address the second condition for change by exploring various anomalies which suggest that the paradigm may be becoming incoherent. This chapter begins, however, with a closer look at transnational civil society. The Gramscian perspective in general, and the neo-Gramscian approach to international relations in particular, indicate that organic intellectuals – an expression that refers to political activists who unite theory with social practice – are unlikely to emerge from the ruling class. That group is homogeneously committed to growth as a policy priority, and all major international institutions (as constructed by that class) are likewise deeply committed to the paradigm. Civil society, on the other hand, though an active participant in the culture of consumerism, is less homogeneous because of its sheer size and complexity, and because the democratic impulse actively encourages a plethora of
competing ideas within it. Moreover, given that the social costs of neoliberal economic growth, such as pollution or eroded social services, tend to fall mainly on the civil population, change is more likely to emerge from among those who bear such costs. Social forces opposed to hegemonic structures and processes are obliged, on the neo-Gramscian view, not merely to oppose but to actively construct alternative social systems. This implies that a compelling counternarrative (or perhaps multiple counternarratives) must be made available to form, in effect, the ideational component of a counter-hegemonic structure; and that an organizational project must be undertaken by elements of civil society such that a transition from one leadership cadre to another, and from one set of functional institutions to another, can be achieved. Gramsci distinguishes in this respect between ‘wars of position’ and ‘wars of maneuver’, terms derived from the military lexicon but intended by him to apply to two different types of political change.1 War of position refers to the longer and more arduous process described above in which a counter-hegemonic structure – in effect, a parallel paradigm – is put in place, as far as that may be possible, prior to the transition so that social disruption is minimized. War of maneuver refers to a decapitation strike which usurps command, control and communication systems, such as occurred with the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. This latter type of transformation, though faster and more violent, is less likely to be successful if the civil society affected by it is intimately engaged with the state, and is complexly institutionalized. Cox has noted that a war of maneuver often produces ‘a fragile victory likely to succumb to the entrenched forces of a recalcitrant civil society’,2 but this was not the case in twentiethcentury Russia. A strong and well-formed state-society complex did not exist, so the Bolshevik victory was durable. Western Europe, on the other hand, presented a different and more challenging set of circumstances, as Gramsci perceived from the vantage of the Italian Communist Party. In Europe, the liberal democratic state was more closely united with civil society, and the latter played a much more active role than in Russia. Gramsci saw, in the interwar interval of the 1930s, that capitalism and fascism could not be so easily defeated by communist insurgency, that the Russian example could not be repeated, and that wars of position would have to undertaken instead. Similar circumstances obtain today with respect to the growth paradigm. Given its broad consensus and deep social engagement, a ‘war of maneuver’ – a decapitation strike against the paradigm – seems impossible to conceive. No single force, independently of transnational civil society, could significantly alter its material or ideational components, or its trajectory through time.
