ABSTRACT
In December 1957 a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit decided that long-range theatre nuclear forces (TNF) "will have to be put" at NATO's disposal. In a broader perspective, however, a decision to deploy an approved near- initial operational capacity long-range TNF in Western Europe is only one step toward restoring a viable deterrence posture in Europe and providing some degree of political stability in European East-West relations for the rest of the century. New long-range TNFs are but one important step in what is bound to be an agonizing reappraisal of the alliance's strategic requirements. In order for NATO to agree on promising follow-up uses of TNFs, there would first have to be some agreement on more specific options for the initial use of the TNF. Given the prevailing "conservative" stand on both alliance strategy and negotiating policy, NATO is likely to end up with neither nuclear force improvements nor balanced negotiating outcomes.
