ABSTRACT
Introduction The question which forms the core of this chapter, ‘Will Myanmar’s stunning transition from a military state to a multiparty pluralistic democratic state be sustained?’, is of course that at the heart of every Myanmar scholar, citizen and activist, as well as the international community. On the one hand, there are those close to the centre of the political changes who observe the new air of confidence in Myanmar. They can point to the commitment to reform of its President Thein Sein, a former general and former prime minister who served in the military government of Senior General Than Shwe, and the significant steps towards national reconciliation subsequent to the 1 April 2012 by-elections. The latter led to the country’s most prominent political dissident, leader of the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, taking her seat in the 440 member Lower House (Pyithu Hluttaw) of Parliament along with 42 other opposition politicians from her party. On the other hand, there are many, particularly among the expatriate community based in Western countries, and even among scholars of democratic transitions, who take a more sceptical view of the reforms and the transition processes. They are yet to be convinced that the reform processes will continue and that Myanmar will proceed to develop along a democratic trajectory, until it eventually becomes a recognizably consolidated democracy like Japan. Myanmar’s chequered political history since independence from the colonial power, Britain, on 4 January 1948, does not give them confidence that this new beginning will be sustained. They look at Myanmar’s entrenched authoritarian political culture, wherein the military establishment has been raised on the philosophy that they are best placed to ensure the continued security, unity and development of the country. The many miss-steps along the way to a democratic transition also suggest caution, including the world’s longest running civil war, of over five decades, and the country’s unsavoury history of repression and egregious human rights abuses perpetrated against Myanmar’s ethnic minority people as well as dissidents within its majority Burman population, as tabled annually at the United Nations (UN), and catalogued by international human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch. There is no doubt of the urgent need for wide-ranging ‘root and branch’
reform of all aspects of Myanmar’s socio-political governance and institutions, if the visions of a thoroughly democratic Myanmar led by a civilian government which receives the loyalty of a subordinated military sector are to be eventually realized. In practical terms, given the extent of the required transformation processes, the movement from the democratic transition phase to a more consolidated democracy, wherein democratic principles are deeply distilled in the general electorate, will take some time. At this point, although it is possible to refer to many issues which might support either the optimistic or the sceptical perspective on the long-term viability of Myanmar’s democratic transition, it is not possible to say definitively which viewpoint will be proven correct; however, the preponderance of views both from Myanmar citizens and elder statesmen in the country, as well as key figures in the international community, suggest that this newest member of the democracy club may be able to gradually make the necessary governance changes to ensure that it will not resile from the reformist programme it has set itself. Drawing on its own internal resources as well as those now made available to the country through the encouraging stance of the international community, Myanmar may be able to sustain this transitional process and emerge into a more mature phase of civilian rule, as Indonesia appears to have accomplished. In examining these key issues, this chapter will discuss some significant political and socio-economic aspects of this transition.
