This chapter refutes the notion that America ‘remained aloof from the Sino-Indian dispute over borders except during the 1962 war and its immediate aftermath’. It explores the enhanced Indo-US interactions prior to the outbreak of war that undermined the principle of non-alignment. It argues that India did not give up non-alignment on 19 November 1962 when Nehru requested President Kennedy to provide air power backup to face the Chinese attacks; instead, non-alignment collapsed on the day America was allowed to use Indian soil to carry out covert operations to support the separatist movement in Tibet.

The chapter traces the emergence of a pro-Tibet lobby in India comprising of Hindu nationalists and pro-American socialists. Jayaprakash Narayan’s private papers are used to examine the extent of collaboration between the American and Indian non-government agencies in helping the Dalai Lama’s organization sustain its stay in India. Tibetan freedom became the glue that bound the Indian liberals and conservatives into a single anti-communist entity that used the Tibet card almost in the same manner as their Pakistani counterparts used the Kashmir card to shape their politics. The chapter discusses President Eisenhower’s visit to India and its linkages to the build-up of India-China hostilities.