ABSTRACT
After the foundation of the Kemalist Republic in 1923, Atatürk’s modernization project aimed at Turkey’s integration into the West. Consequently, Turkey made every effort to join the Western system of alliances in order to establish diverse strategic partnerships with NATO, the CoE and the OECD. Although Turkey has already accomplished membership in Europe’s core regional organization dealing with ‘security’ (NATO), accession to the primarily ‘welfare’-oriented EU was understood as a kind of necessary institutional complement: ‘NATO with money’. Although the EU only offered indirect security guarantees, Turkey’s regional location at the crossroads of well-known trouble spots make it receptive for any kind of additional security. Moreover, the EU’s development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the creation of a ‘Rapid Reaction Force’ could be interpreted as increasing evidence for the new importance Europe attaches to enhancing its direct security capabilities. As Turkey is a NATO member but not yet an EU member, its influence on European defence is limited to the right of consultancy and Ankara has no institutional say in the deployment of Europe’s new army. Given Turkey’s historical experience of regional sensitivities with Greece in the eastern Mediterranean, Ankara still fears that European troops could be stationed in the Aegean without its consent – on Cyprus even, against Turkey. It is therefore small wonder that Turkey blocked the development of the ESDP as long as its national interest was not sufficiently met. In conclusion, Turkey’s interest in EU membership is perfectly compatible with ‘realist’ notions of relative gains
with regard to Greece and Ankara’s general concerns for security in the ‘tough neighbourhood’ of the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans.
